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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44659
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-16-26583
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Adam R. Dockins pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, the
district court sentenced him to four years, with one year fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
Mr. Dockins appeals. He contends the district court abused its discretion by not
suspending his sentence and placing him on probation.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In August of 2016, the State filed a Complaint alleging Mr. Dockins committed the
crimes of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of
I.C. § 37-2732(c), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a syringe, in violation of
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I.C. § 37-2734A. (R., pp.6–7.) According to the Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSI”), the police searched a car, driven by Mr. Dockins, and found a crystal substance
and a syringe inside a plastic glove between the front seats. (PSI,1 p.3.) Mr. Dockins
waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound him over to district court.
(R., pp.14–16.) The State filed an Information charging Mr. Dockins with possession of
a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.6–7.) Pursuant to
a plea agreement, Mr. Dockins pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance.
(Tr., p.22, Ls.4–p.23, L.11; R., p.28 (written plea agreement).) The State agreed to
dismiss the paraphernalia charge. (R., p.28.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended a sentence of seven years,
with two years fixed, and Mr. Dockins requested a sentence of five years, with one year
fixed. (Tr., p.34, L.24–p.35, L.2, p.38, Ls.8–11.) The State and Mr. Dockins both
recommended the district court suspend Mr. Dockins’s sentence and place him on
probation. (Tr., p.33, Ls.3–8, p.34, L.24–p.35, L.8, p.38, Ls.8–11.) The presentence
investigator recommended the district court retain jurisdiction (a “rider”). (PSI, p.16.) The
district court sentenced Mr. Dockins to four years, with one year fixed. (Tr., p.41, Ls.17–
20; R., pp.38–40.) The district court did not place Mr. Dockins on probation and instead
retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.41, L.20–p.42, L.2; R., p.39.)
Mr. Dockins timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction.2
(R., pp.42–43.)
1 Citations to the PSI refer to the 109-page electronic document containing the
confidential exhibits.
2 The district court’s judgement of conviction contains a clerical error: it states
Mr. Dockins’s pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and possession of
drug paraphernalia. (R., p.38.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of four
years, with one year fixed, upon Mr. Dockins, following his guilty plea to possession of a
controlled substance?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Four
Years, With One Year Fixed, Upon Mr. Dockins, Following His Guilty Plea To
Possession Of A Controlled Substance
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v.
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Dockins’s
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (seven year
maximum). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable,
Mr. Dockins “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive
under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3)
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
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related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho
122, 132 (2011).
“The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial
court to gain additional information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential and
suitability for probation.” State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005).
“[P]robation is the ultimate objective of a defendant who is on retained jurisdiction.” Id.
at 677. The district court’s decision to retain jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Id. “There can be no abuse of discretion in a trial court’s refusal to retain
jurisdiction if the court already has sufficient information upon which to conclude that the
defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation.” Id. Similarly, “[t]he choice of
probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1990).
Here, Mr. Dockins asserts the district court abused its discretion by declining to
suspend his sentence and place him on probation. He contends the information in the
record demonstrates he is a suitable candidate for probation.
The absence of a serious criminal record shows Mr. Dockins can succeed on
probation while also providing adequate protection for society. “The absence of a
criminal record is a mitigating factor that courts consider.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,
836 (2011). “It has long been recognized that ‘[t]he first offender should be accorded
more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.” State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673
(Ct. App. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982)).
Here, Mr. Dockins’s criminal record contains five alleged misdemeanor offenses,3 but
3 One of the offenses is designated as “unknown.” (PSI, p.5.)
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these offenses occurred in 2004 and 2006. Mr. Dockins was not charged with any
additional crimes until the instant offense in August of 2016. The instant offense is
Mr. Dockins’s first felony conviction. Thus, Mr. Dockins’s criminal history consists of one
felony offense and ten- and twelve-year-old misdemeanors. This information shows
Mr. Dockins is not a danger to society and can comply with the terms of supervision.
Further, the unfortunate circumstances that caused Mr. Dockins’s relapse do not
lead to the conclusion that Mr. Dockins should be incarcerated on a rider. Mr. Dockins
began experimenting with methamphetamine at age twelve, but stopped using in his
early twenties. (PSI, pp.4, 12.) In 2005, he got married and had two children. (PSI, pp.7-
8.) He also served in the military for two years before a hardship discharge. (PSI, p.10.)
While he was serving in the military, his wife moved from Oregon to Idaho with their
children. (PSI, p.7.) It seems Mr. Dockins returned to Oregon, not Idaho, after his
discharge from the military. (PSI, p.7.) In 2012, Mr. Dockins and his wife divorced. (PSI,
p.8.) Mr. Dockins was employed as a handyman and then as a heavy equipment
operator in Oregon. (PSI, p.10.) During this time, it appears Mr. Dockins remained drug-
free. (PSI, pp.12, 19.) In June of 2015, a work accident started the downward spiral that
led to Mr. Dockins’s relapse. Mr. Dockins got hit by a semi-truck at work, injured his
back, and lost his job. (PSI, pp.10, 13.) He became homeless. (PSI, pp.7, 13.) Then,
about two months before the instant offense, Mr. Dockins decided to go to Idaho to visit
his children. (PSI, pp.7, 8.) In Idaho, he learned the State of Idaho had taken his
children into protective custody due to his ex-wife’s drug use. (PSI, pp.8, 11, 12.)
Mr. Dockins “began injecting as much methamphetamine as he could tolerate” to cope
with his feelings. (PSI, pp.4, 11, 12.) He admitted he had contemplated suicide in the
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past, but did not follow through because of his children.4 (PSI, pp.11, 12; see also PSI,
p.23 (“fleeting” thoughts of suicide while incarcerated).) These facts demonstrate
Mr. Dockins’s relapse was purely matter of circumstance—Mr. Dockins was
unemployed, homeless, depressed, and worried about his children. These facts also
establish, however, that Mr. Dockins is able to maintain steady employment, stay sober,
and contribute to society. With proper treatment and supervision, Mr. Dockins can lead
a productive life in the community while still providing adequate protection to society.
In light of these facts, Mr. Dockins asserts the district court abused its discretion
by declining to suspend his sentence. The district court should have given him the
opportunity to show he can succeed on probation.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Dockins respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
judgment of conviction retaining jurisdiction and remand this case with instructions for
the district court to suspend Mr. Dockins’s sentence and place him on probation.
DATED this 5th day of April, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
4 Mental health treatment was also recommended for Mr. Dockins. (PSI, pp.29–30.) He
reported being diagnosed with ADHD, depression, and bipolar disorder. (PSI, p.11.)
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